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Abstract
We investigate the trade-offs between price stability and the sustainability of sovereign 
debt, using a small open economy model where the government issues nominal defaultable 
debt and chooses fi scal and monetary policy under discretion. When choosing infl ation, 
the government trades off the reduction in the real value of debt -which makes it more 
sustainable- against the welfare costs of infl ation. We compare this scenario with one in 
which the government gives up the ability to defl ate debt away, e.g. by issuing foreign 
currency debt or joining a monetary union with an anti-infl ationary stance. We fi nd that 
the benefi ts of abandoning debt defl ation outweigh the costs, even when the economy is 
close to default. Crucially, the increase in infl ation expectations and hence in nominal yields 
produced by discretionary monetary policy largely undoes the debt defl ation effect.
Keywords: monetary- fi scal interactions, discretion, sovereign default, continuous time, optimal 
stopping.
JEL classifi cation: E5, E62,F34.
Resumen
En este trabajo investigamos la interacción entre estabilidad de precios y sostenibilidad 
de la deuda soberana en el marco de un modelo de pequeña economía abierta, en la cual 
el gobierno emite deuda nominal y elige la política fi scal y monetaria bajo discreción. La 
infl ación reduce el valor real de la deuda, lo cual la hace más sostenible; pero también eleva 
sus rendimientos nominales y conlleva costes directos de bienestar. Comparamos este 
escenario con una situación en la cual el gobierno renuncia a la posibilidad de defl actar la 
deuda: por ejemplo, emitiendo deuda en moneda extranjera o incorporándose a una unión 
monetaria con un mandato anti-infl acionista. Encontramos que los benefi cios de renunciar 
a dicho margen de ajuste dominan a los costes, tanto para nuestra calibración base como 
para un amplio rango de parámetros. Ello es debido a que el aumento de las expectativas 
de infl ación y por tanto de los rendimientos nominales producido por la política monetaria 
discrecional compensa parcialmente los efectos de la defl ación de la deuda.
Palabras clave: interacción monetaria-fi scal, discrecionalidad, impago soberano, tiempo 
continuo, parada óptima.
Códigos JEL: E5, E62,F34.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 7 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1517
1 Introduction
One of the main legacies of the 2007-9 financial crisis and the subsequent recession has been the
emergence of large fiscal deficits across the industrialized world. The consequence has been a sharp
increase in government debt, with debt-to-GDP ratios near or above record levels in countries such
as the United States, United Kingdom, Japan or the Euro area periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, Spain). Before the summer of 2012, Euro area periphery economies experienced dramatic
spikes in their sovereign yields, whereas other highly indebted countries did not. Many observers
emphasized that a key difference between both groups of countries was that, whereas the US, UK
and Japan had the option to deflate away the real burden of nominal debt though inflation, the
Euro countries were forced to repay debt solely through fiscal surpluses. At the same time, the
experience of a number of developing countries such as Mexico or Brazil, in which large portions of
sovereign debt are issued directly in foreign currency, illustrates situations in which governments
sometimes renounce the possibility of deflating away their debt.
These developments raise the question as to what role monetary policy should have, if any,
in guaranteeing the sustainability of sovereign debt, in view of the existing trade-offs between
the latter and price stability. Broadly speaking, on the one hand it can be argued that central
banks should provide a ‘monetary brake’ that reassures investors in sovereign debt.1 On the other
hand, such a course of action may presumably give rise to inflation, with the resulting costs and
distortions. Moreover, while using inflation temporarily for debt-deflation purposes may not largely
affect inflation expectations in countries (such as the US or UK) where monetary authorities are
perceived to have a clear and credible commitment towards price stability, the same may not be
true in countries with a poorer inflation record and/or weaker monetary credibility, thus limiting
the effectiveness of debt deflation policies.
In this paper, we try to shed light on the above issues by studying the trade-offs between price
stability and sovereign debt sustainability when the government cannot make credible commitments
about inflation. With this purpose, we build a general equilibrium, continuous-time model of a
small open economy in which a benevolent government issues long-term sovereign nominal bonds
to foreign investors. At any time, the government may default on its debt if it finds it optimal to
do so. Default produces some costs due to temporary exclusion from capital markets and a drop in
the output endowment. We show that the default decision is characterized by an optimal default
threshold for the model’s single state variable, the debt-to-GDP ratio. In addition, the government
chooses fiscal and monetary policy optimally under discretion. That is, the government cannot
commit to a future path for primary deficit and inflation. When choosing inflation, the government
trades off benefits and costs. On the one hand, inflation reduces the real value of debt; ceteris
1This view is shared e.g. by Krugman (2011) or De Grauwe (2011).
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paribus, this improves sovereign debt sustainability by making default a less likely outcome. On
the other hand, inflation entails a direct welfare cost. Moreover, expectations of future inflation
worsen such trade-off by raising nominal yields for new bond issuances, thus making primary
deficits more costly to finance.
We calibrate our model to capture some salient features of the EMU periphery economies, in-
cluding their observed inflation record prior to joining the euro. Under our baseline calibration, the
optimal inflation policy function increases roughly linearly with the debt ratio, and then increases
steeply as the latter approaches the optimal default threshold. Importantly, the government allows
for relatively high inflation rates at debt ratios for which default is still perceived as rather distant
by investors. We refer to this baseline scenario as the ’inflationary regime’.
We then compare the baseline inflationary regime with a scenario in which inflation is zero at
all times. In other words, the government effectively renounces the possibility of deflating debt
away. Given our assumption that the government cannot make credible inflation commitments,
this ’no inflation’ regime is best interpreted as a situation in which the government directly issues
foreign currency debt, or in which it joins a monetary union with a very strong and credible anti-
inflationary stance. We find that welfare in the no-inflation regime is higher at any debt ratio.
The reason is that the no-inflation regime avoids the costs of inflation while barely compromising
the sustainability of sovereign debt. Indeed, while renouncing the option to deflate debt away does
make debt more vulnerable by making default more likely, such an event is still perceived as rather
distant by investors at all debt ratios except for those very close to default. As a result, the (small)
increase in risk premia vis-à-vis the inflationary regime is clearly dominated by the elimination
of the inflation premia, with the ensuing reduction in bond yields. Moreover, even at relatively
high debt ratios, the beneficial effects of inflation on debt sustainability are largely undone by the
increase in nominal yields.2
Having characterized equilibrium in both regimes at each point of the state space, we then
compute the stationary distribution of the main variables so as to analyze the average performance
of both regimes. Since value functions in both regimes are strictly decreasing in debt ratios, the
inflationary regime could in principle yield higher average welfare by delivering sufficiently lower
debt most of the time. We find that the inflationary regime indeed shifts the distribution of the
debt ratio to the left vis-à-vis the no-inflation one, reflecting the debt deflation effect. However,
this shift is too small to overturn the state-by-state dominance of the no inflation regime. The
reason, again, is that the debt deflation effect is mostly compensated by the increase in nominal
yields. With the debt deflation channel thus weakened, the direct welfare costs of inflation become
2We also find that optimal default thresholds are nearly identical in both regimes, and that welfare under no-
inflation is higher too at such threshold. Intuitively, the prospect of defaulting is less favorable in the inflationary
regime, because following the exclusion period the government returns to capital markets with basically the same
debt burden as in the no-inflation regime, only with lower welfare due to the inflationary distortions.
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the dominant effect on welfare outcomes. As a consequence, the inflationary regime produces a
loss in average welfare relative to the no-inflation scenario, one that is of first-order magnitude
in our baseline calibration. We show that our findings are robust to a wide range of alternative
parameter values.
Finally, as an alternative to giving up the debt deflation margin altogether, we investigate an
intermediate arrangement in which the government delegates monetary policy to an independent
central banker with a greater distaste for inflation than society as a whole. We find that delegating
monetary policy to such a ’conservative’ central banker allows achieving superior welfare outcomes
vis-à-vis the baseline inflationary regime, in which the benevolent government chooses inflation
discretionarily. As it turns out, however, average welfare never reaches that of the ’no inflation’
regime: it increases monotonically with the central banker’s distaste for inflation, converging
asymptotically to its level under the latter regime.
Taken together, our results offer an important qualification of the conventional wisdom that
individual countries may benefit from retaining the option to deflate away their sovereign debt. In
particular, our analysis suggests that such countries may actually be better off by renouncing such
a tool if their governments are unable to make credible commitments about their future inflation
policy. This qualification may be relevant for most EMU peripheral economies, in view of their
inflation record (relative e.g. to that of Germany) in the decades prior to joining the euro. Our
findings may also rationalize why a number of developing countries with limited inflation credibility
typically resort to issuing debt in terms of a hard foreign currency.
Literature review. Our paper relates to a recent theoretical literature that analyzes the
link between sovereign debt vulnerability and monetary policy. One strand of this literature con-
siders models of self-fulfilling debt crises, typically along the lines of Calvo (1988) or Cole and
Kehoe (2000); see e.g. Aguiar et al. (2013), Reis (2013), Corsetti and Dedola (2014), Camous
and Cooper (2014), and Bacchetta, Perazzi and van Wincoop (2015). We complement this lit-
erature by considering a framework in which sovereign default is instead an optimal government
decision based on fundamentals, in the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).3 Also, most of the
above contributions are qualitative, working in environments with two periods or two-period-lived
agents (Corsetti and Dedola, 2014; Camous and Cooper, 2014) or without fundamental uncertainty
(Aguiar et al., 2013).4 By contrast, we adopt a fully dynamic, stochastic approach, which makes
3In Corsetti and Dedola (2014) default crisis can also be due to weak fundamentals.
4An exception is Bachetta et al. (2014), who explore quantitatively a monetary version of Lorenzoni and
Werning’s (2014) ’slow moving’ debt crisis model, which in turn extends the Calvo (1998) framework to a dynamic
setting. In their baseline model, fundamental uncertainty is restricted to the present value of primary surpluses from
a known future date onwards. They also consider an extension in which the date at which the surplus uncertainty
is resolved is itself random. The connection between inflation and the possibility of self-fulfilling debt crisis in fully
dynamic, stochastic frameworks is also analyzed in Da Rocha et al. (2013) and Araujo et al. (2013). Da Rocha et al.
(2013) analyze optimal debt and exchange rate policy in a model with foreign currency debt where the government
is exposed to both self-fulfilling defaults and devaluations. Araujo et al. (2013) consider the welfare gains or losses
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our model potentially useful for quantitative analysis. In particular, we show that our model can
replicate well average sovereign yields and risk premia in the peripheral EMU economies, while
also matching average external sovereign debt stocks. We also show that our model can rationalize
the reduction in sovereign bond yields across EMU periphery countries relative to the pre-EMU
period, which suggests that investors perceived the reduction in inflation expectations as more
important than the presumable increase in default risk.
Our modeling of inflation disutility costs is based on Aguiar et al. (2013), who interpret the
weight on such disutility in government preferences as the government’s ‘inflation credibility’.5
These authors find that, under certain conditions (such as a moderate inflation credibility and
intermediate debt levels), issuing domestic currency debt and deflating it at discretion may achieve
superior welfare outcomes relative to issuing foreign currency debt. By contrast, we find that
issuing foreign currency debt outperforms issuing domestic currency debt for any debt ratio, even
when the economy is close to default. In our analysis of monetary policy delegation, we similarly
find that abandoning debt deflation produces higher average welfare regardless of the monetary
authority’s distaste for inflation.
In modeling optimal default à la Eaton-Gersovitz in a quantitative framework, our model is
more in line with the literature on quantitative sovereign default models initiated by Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008).6 We build on this literature by introducing nominal bonds
and studying the optimal inflation policy when the government cannot commit not to inflate
in the future. This allows us to address the trade-offs between price stability and sovereign debt
vulnerability in a unified framework.7 Another difference with respect to the quantitative sovereign
default literature is our reliance on continuous time. Continuous-time methods are standard in the
corporate default literature initiated by Merton (1974) and Leland (1994) due to their tractability.8
We show how one can extend this analysis to the pricing of defaultable nominal sovereign debt.
from issuing debt in local versus foreign currency, in a framework where the costs of local currency debt are due to
an exogenous inflation shock.
5In an environment similar to Aguiar et al. (2013), Aguiar et al. (2015) study the impact of the composition of
debt in a monetary union on the occurrence of self-fulfilling debt crises. One important difference between Aguiar
et al. (2013, 2015) and our paper is that we consider quadratic (as opposed to linear) inflation costs, which allows
us to obtain interior solutions for optimal inflation.
6Other notable contributions to this literature include Benjamin and Wright (2009), Chatterjee and Eyigungor
(2012), Hatchondo and Martínez (2009) and Yue (2010). Mendoza and Yue (2012) integrate an optimal sovereign
default model into a standard real business cycle framework with endogenous production.
7Other papers introducing nominal debt and monetary policy in sovereign default models à la Aguiar-Gopinath
(2006) and Arellano (2008) are Sunder-Plassmann (2014) and Du and Schreger (2015). Sunder-Plassmann (2014)
studies how the denomination of sovereign debt (nominal vs. real/foreign currency) affects the government’s incen-
tives to inflate or default on its debt, in a model with monetary frictions. Du and Schreger (2015) analyze how the
share of local vs. foreign currency debt in overall corporate debt determines the sovereign’s incentive to inflate or
default on its own debt when the latter is denominated in local currency, in a framework where firms face borrowing
constraints and a currency mismatch between revenues and liabilities.
8See Sundaresan (2013) for a survey of this literature.
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In studying the effects of delegating monetary policy to an independent, conservative central
banker, our analysis revisits an old theme initiated by Rogoff (1985) and further discussed e.g. in
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999), although it does so in a very different context.9 In particular, we
explore the effects of delegation in a framework in which the benefit of allowing for inflation is not to
exploit a short-run output/inflation trade-off, as in the mainstream New Keynesian literature, but
rather to make sovereign debt more sustainable. Contrary to the linear(ized) frameworks typically
used in the New Keynesian literature, our framework takes full account of the strong non-linearities
that emerge in the presence of equilibrium sovereign default. As in that literature, we find that
there are welfare gains from delegating discretionary monetary policy to an independent authority
with a greater distaste for inflation than that of society. What is perhaps more striking is that,
whereas the optimal ’delegated’ inflation distaste in the above literature is relatively large but
finite, in our framework welfare is maximized when such distaste is arbitrarily large, i.e. when the
government completely abandons the option of adjusting inflation.
Finally, we make a technical contribution by introducing a new numerical method to find
the equilibrium in continuous-time models with several agents. In particular we extend the recent
literature about finite difference methods applied to stochastic control in economics, such as Achdou
et al. (2014) or Nuño and Moll (2014), to analyze a recursive optimal stopping problem in which
one of the agents (in our case, the government) employs both continuously chosen controls and
discrete adjustments of the state variables. Optimal stopping problems are typically solved using
optimal splitting methods, as in Barles, Daher and Romano (1995). However, the recursivity of
our problem and the fact that it only has one state variable allows us to employ the so-called
“smooth pasting” and “value matching” conditions to numerically find the default threshold.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we introduce the model. Section 3 provides
the main results. In Section 4 we perform some robustness analyses. Section 5 introduces monetary
policy delegation. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a continuous-time model of a small open economy.
2.1 Output, price level and sovereign debt
Let (Ω,F , {Ft} ,P) be a filtered probability space. There is a single, freely-traded consumption
good which has an international price normalized to one. The economy is endowed with Yt units
9Lohmann (1992) generalizes Rogoff’s analysis by considering a conservative central banker that can be overriden
by the government in the presence of extremely large shocks.
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of the good each period (real GDP). The evolution of Yt is given by
dYt = μYtdt+ σYtdWt, (1)
where Wt is a Ft-Brownian motion, μ ∈ R is the drift parameter and σ ∈ R+ is the volatility. The
local currency price relative to the World price at time t is denoted Pt. It evolves according to
dPt = πtPtdt, (2)
where πt is the instantaneous inflation rate.
The government trades a nominal non-contingent bond with risk-neutral competitive foreign
investors. Let Bt denote the outstanding stock of nominal government bonds; assuming that each
bond has a nominal value of one unit of domestic currency, Bt also represents the total nominal
value of outstanding debt. We assume that outstanding debt is amortized at rate λ > 0 per unit
of time. The nominal value of outstanding debt thus evolves as follows,
dBt = B
new
t dt− λdtBt,
where Bnewt is the flow of new debt issued at time t. The nominal market price of government
bonds at time t is Qt. Each bond pays a proportional coupon δ per unit of time. Also, the
government incurs a nominal primary deficit Pt (Ct − Yt), where Ct is aggregate consumption.10
The government’s flow of funds constraint is then
QtB
new
t = (λ+ δ)Bt + Pt (Ct − Yt) .
That is, the proceeds from issuance of new bonds must cover amortization and coupon payments
plus the primary deficit. Combining the last two equations, we obtain the following dynamics for
nominal debt outstanding,
dBt =


λ+ δ
Qt
− λ

Bt +
Pt
Qt
(Ct − Yt)

dt. (3)
We define the debt-to-GDP ratio as bt ≡ Bt/ (PtYt). Its dynamics are obtained by applying Itô’s
lemma to equations (1)-(3),
dbt =


λ+ δ
Qt
− λ+ σ2 − μ− πt

bt +
ct
Qt

dt− σbtdWt, (4)
10As in Arellano (2008), we assume that the government rebates back to households all the net proceedings from
its international credit operations (i.e. its primary deficit) in a lump-sum fashion. Denoting by Tt the primary
deficit, we thus have PtCt = PtYt + Tt. This implies Tt = Pt (Ct − Yt).
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where ct ≡ (Ct − Yt) /Yt is the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio. Equation (4) describes the evolution
of the debt-to-GDP ratio as a function of the primary deficit ratio, inflation and the bond price.
In particular, ceteris paribus inflation πt allows to reduce the debt ratio by reducing the real value
of nominal debt. We also impose a non-negativity constraint on debt: bt ≥ 0.
2.2 Preferences
The representative household has preferences over paths for consumption and domestic inflation
given by
U0 ≡ E0
 ∞
0
e−ρtu(Ct, πt)dt

. (5)
We assume that instantaneous utility takes the form
u(Ct, πt) = log(Ct)−
ψ
2
π2t , (6)
where ψ > 0. We follow Aguiar et al. (2013) in posing a reduced-form specification for the
welfare costs of inflation, (ψ/2) π2t . Unlike in Aguiar et al. (2013), though, we consider a quadratic
functional form, which allows us to obtain interior solutions for optimal inflation.11 Using Ct =
(1 + ct)Yt, we can express welfare in terms of the primary deficit ratio ct as follows,
U0 = E0
 ∞
0
e−ρt


log(1 + ct) + log(Yt)−
ψ
2
π2t

dt

= E0
 ∞
0
e−ρt


log(1 + ct)−
ψ
2
π2t

dt

+ V aut0 , (7)
where
V aut0 ≡ E0
 ∞
0
e−ρt log(Yt)dt

=
log(Y0)
ρ
+
μ− σ2/2
ρ2
(8)
is the (exogenous) value at time t = 0 of being in autarky forever.12 Thus, welfare increases
with the primary deficit ratio ct, as this allows households to consume more for a given exogenous
output; and it decreases with squared inflation deviations from zero.
11Aguiar et al. (2013) adopt instead a linear inflation disutility, and restrict inflation to be within a closed
interval. As explained by the authors, this gives rise to bang-bang inflation equilibria.
12Notice that (1) and Itô’s Lemma imply d log Yt =

μ− σ2/2

dt+ σdWt. Solving for log Yt and taking time−0
conditional expectations yields E0 (log Yt) = log Y0+

μ− σ2/2

t, which combined with the definition of V aut0 gives
us the right-hand side of (8).
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2.3 Fiscal and monetary policy
The government chooses fiscal policy at each point in time along two dimensions: it sets optimally
the primary surplus ratio ct, and it chooses whether to continue honoring debt repayments or else
to default. In addition, the government implements monetary policy by choosing the inflation
rate πt at each point in time. We now present the sovereign default scenario, which affects the
boundary conditions of the general optimization problem.
2.3.1 The default scenario
In case of default, the government suffers a double punishment. First, it is excluded from in-
ternational capital markets temporarily. The duration of this exclusion period, τ , is random
and follows an exponential distribution with average duration 1/χ. Second, during the exclu-
sion period the country’s output endowment declines. Suppose the government defaults at an
arbitrary debt ratio b. Then during the exclusion period the country’s output endowment is
given by Y deft = Yt exp[−max{0, b − bˆ}], with , bˆ > 0, such that the loss in (log)output equals
max{0, b − bˆ}. Therefore, the country suffers an output loss only if it defaults at a debt ratio
higher than a threshold bˆ. This specification of output loss is similar to the one in Arellano (2008).13
During the exclusion phase, households simply consume the output endowment, Ct = Y
def
t , which
implies
log (Ct) = log (Yt)− max{0, b− bˆ}.
The main advantage of defaulting is of course the possibility of reducing the debt burden. During
the exclusion period, which we may interpret as a renegotiation process between the government
and the investors, the latter receive no repayments. Let tˆ denote the time of the most recent
default. We assume that at the end of the exclusion period, i.e. at time tˆ + τ , both parties
reach an agreement by which investors recover a fraction θYtˆ+τPtˆ+τ/ (YtˆPtˆ) of the nominal value of
outstanding bonds at the time of default, for some parameter θ > 0.14 This specification captures
in reduced form the idea that the terms of the debt restructuring agreement are somehow sensitive
to the country’s macroeconomic performance.15 Importantly, it allows us to keep the set of state
variables restricted to the debt ratio only. To see this, notice that upon regaining access to capital
13In Arellano (2008), the output loss following default equals Yt − Y deft = max{0, Yt − Yˆ }, for some threshold
output level Yˆ . Specifying our output loss function in terms of bt (as opposed to Yt) allows us to retain the
convenient model feature that bt is the only relevant state variable.
14Notice that Ytˆ and Ytˆ+τ represent, respectively, the output levels exactly at the time the government decides
to default (i.e. right before output drops) and exactly upon regaining access to capital markets ( i.e. right after
output recovers again). Therefore, they do not incorporate the output loss during exclusion.
15See Benjamin and Wright (2009) and Yue (2010) for studies that endogenize the recovery rate upon default, in
models with explicit renegotiation betwen the government and its creditors.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1517
markets, the debt ratio is
btˆ+τ =


θ
Ytˆ+τPtˆ+τ
YtˆPtˆ

Btˆ
1
Ytˆ+τPtˆ+τ
= θbtˆ,
where btˆ = Btˆ/YtˆPtˆ is the debt ratio at the time of default. Therefore, the government reenters
capital markets with a debt ratio that is a fraction θ of the ratio at which it defaulted. It follows
that the government has no incentive to create inflation during the exclusion period, as that would
generate direct welfare costs while not reducing the debt ratio upon reentry; we thus have πt = 0
for t ∈ (tˆ, tˆ+ τ).
Taking all these elements together, we can express the value of defaulting at tˆ = 0 as Udef0 =
V def0 + V
aut
0 , where V
aut
0 is the autarky value as defined in (8), and V
def
0 ≡ Vdef (b0) is the value of
defaulting net of the autarky value, given by
Vdef (b) = E

−
 τ
0
e−ρtmax{0, b− bˆ}dt+ e−ρτV (θb)

=
 ∞
0
χe−χτ


−
 τ
0
e−ρtmax{0, b− bˆ}dt+ e−ρτV (θb)

dτ
= −max{0, b− bˆ}
ρ+ χ
+
χ
ρ+ χ
V (θb) , (9)
where in the second equality we use our assumption that τ is exponentially distributed, and where
V (·) is the value function of the government, to be defined later. For future reference, the slope
of the default value function is
V def (b) = −

ρ+ χ
1(b > bˆ) +
χ
ρ+ χ
V  (θb) θ, (10)
where 1(·) is the indicator function.
2.3.2 The general problem
As mentioned before, at every point in time the government decides optimally whether to default
or not, in addition to choosing the primary deficit ratio and the inflation rate. Following a default,
and once the government regains access to capital markets, it starts accumulating debt and is
confronted again with the choice of defaulting. This is a sequence of recursive optimal stopping
problems, as one of the policy instruments is a sequence of stopping times. The solution to this
problem will be characterized by an optimal default threshold for the debt ratio, which we denote by
b∗. This threshold defines an “inaction region” of the state space, [0, b∗), in which the government
chooses not to default, and a region [b∗,∞) in which the government defaults. We denote by T (b∗)
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the time to default. The latter is a stopping time with respect to the filtration {Ft}, defined as
the smallest time t such that bt+t = b∗, i.e. T (b∗) = min{t : bt+t = b∗}.16 The government
maximizes social welfare (i.e. it behaves benevolently) under discretion. The value function of the
government (net of the exogenous autarky value) at time t = 0 can then be expressed as
V (b) = max
b∗,{ct,πt}
E0
 T (b∗)
0
e−ρt


log(1 + ct)−
ψ
2
π2t

dt+ e−ρT (b
∗)Vdef (b
∗) | b0 = b

, (11)
subject to the law of motion of the debt ratio, equation (4). The optimal default threshold b∗ must
satisfy the following two conditions,
V (b∗) = Vdef (b
∗), (12)
V  (b∗) = V def (b
∗), (13)
where Vdef (b∗) and V def (b
∗) are given respectively by equations (9) and (10) evaluated at b = b∗.
Equation (12) is the value matching condition and it requires that, at the default threshold, the
value of honoring debt repayments equals the value of defaulting. Equation (13) is the smooth
pasting condition, and it requires that there is no kink at the optimal default threshold.17 Both
are standard conditions in optimal stopping problems; see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Oksendal
and Sulem (2007) and Stokey (2009). These conditions imply that the value function is continuous
and continuously differentiable: V ∈ C1([0,∞)).18
The solution of this problem must satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation,
ρV (b) = max
c,π

log(1 + c)− ψ
2
π2 +


λ+ δ
Q(b)
− λ+ σ2 − μ− π

b+
c
Q(b)

V (b) +
(σb)2
2
V (b)

,
(14)
∀b ∈ [0, b∗), together with the boundary conditions (12) and (13).19 The term in squared brackets
in (14) is the drift of the state variable (see equation 4). The optimal primary deficit ratio and
inflation rate are given by the following first order conditions,
c =
Q(b)
−V (b) − 1 ≡ c (b) , (15)
π = − b
ψ
V (b) ≡ π (b) . (16)
16Therefore, the time of default in absolute time is tˆ = t+ T (b∗), i.e. T (b∗) = tˆ− t.
17To be precise, the smooth pasting condition holds as long as b∗ = bˆ as the continuation value Vdef (b) is not
differentiable at bˆ.
18In addition to these two boundary conditions, there exists the state constraint b ≥ 0 introduced above.
19Obviously, ∀b ∈ [b∗,∞), V (b) = Vdef (b).
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Therefore, the optimal primary deficit ratio increases with bond prices and decreases with the
slope of the value function (in absolute value). The intuition is straightforward. Higher bond
prices (equivalently, lower bond yields) make it cheaper for the government to finance primary
deficits. Likewise, a steeper value function makes it more costly to increase the debt burden by
incurring primary deficits. As regards optimal inflation, the latter increases both with the debt
ratio and the slope (in absolute value) of the value function. Intuitively, the higher the debt ratio
the larger the reduction in the debt burden that can be achieved through a marginal increase in
inflation. Similarly, a steeper value function increases the incentive to use inflation so as to reduce
the debt burden.
2.3.3 The ’no inflation’ regime
So far we have analyzed the decision problem of a benevolent government that cannot make credible
commitments about its future fiscal policy (including the possibility of defaulting) and monetary
policy. In particular, the inability to commit not to use inflation in the future so as to deflate debt
away implies that the government is unable to steer investor’s inflation expectations in a way that
favors welfare outcomes. While lacking commitment, however, we can think of situations in which
the government effectively relinquishes the ability to deflate debt away. Formally, we may consider
a monetary regime in which inflation is zero in all states: π (b) = 0, for all b. The government’s
problem is given by (14) with π = 0 replacing the optimal inflation choice, and with boundary
conditions given again by (12) and (13).
We may interpret such a ’no inflation’ scenario in alternative ways. One can first think of
a situation in which the government appoints an independent central banker with a strong, in
fact arbitrarily great, distaste for inflation. Even under discretion, such a central banker would
always choose π = 0. One problem with this interpretation, though, is that it is unlikely that
a government that cannot make credible commitments about monetary policy would appoint a
central banker with such extreme preferences towards inflation.20
A second, perhaps more plausible interpretation is that the government directly issues bonds
denominated in foreign currency. In that case, the possibility of deflating debt away simply
disappears, and with it the only benefit of inflating in this model. As a result, optimal inflation is
always zero in such a scenario.
Finally, we may think of a situation in which the government joins a monetary union in which
the common monetary authority has an extreme distaste for inflation. If the costs of exiting the
monetary union are very high, then joining it signals a credible anti-inflationary commitment.
20In section 5 we will consider a more general scenario in which the government appoints a conservative central
banker whose distaste for inflation is greater than that of society, but not so extreme as to imply zero inflation at
all times.
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In what follows, we will simply refer to this scenario as the ’no inflation regime’, keeping in
mind that such scenario admits several interpretations along the lines just discussed.
2.4 Foreign investors
When choosing fiscal and monetary policy, the government takes as given the mapping between the
debt ratio and the nominal price of bonds, Q(b). We now characterize such bond price function.
The government sells bonds to competitive risk-neutral foreign investors that can invest elsewhere
at the risk-free real rate r¯. As explained before, bonds pay a coupon rate δ and are amortized at
rate λ. Following a default at time tˆ, and during the exclusion period of the government, investors
receive no payments. Once the exclusion/renegotiation period ends (at time t + τ), investors
recover a fraction θPtˆ+τYtˆ+τ/ (PtˆYtˆ) = θYtˆ+τ/Ytˆ of the nominal value of each bond, where we have
used the fact that optimal inflation is zero during the exclusion period, such that Ptˆ+τ = Ptˆ.
21 They
also anticipate that the government’s debt ratio at the time of reentering financial markets will be
θb∗, such that their outstanding bonds will carry a market price Q (θb∗). Finally, investors discount
future nominal payoffs with the accumulated inflation between the time of the bond purchase and
the time such payoffs accrue. Therefore, the nominal price of the bond at time t = 0 for a current
debt ratio b ≤ b∗ is given by
Q(b) = E0
 T (b∗)
0
e−(r¯+λ)t−
 t
0
πsds (λ+ δ) dt+ e−r¯[T (b
∗)+τ ]−λT (b∗)−
 T (b∗)
0
πsdsθ
YT (b∗)+τ
YT (b∗)
Q (θb∗) | b0 = b

,
(17)
where again T (b∗) denotes the time to default and b follows the law of motion (4).22 Applying the
Feynman-Kac formula, we obtain the following recursive representation,
Q(b) (r¯ + π(b) + λ) = (λ+ δ) +


λ+ δ
Q(b)
− λ+ σ2 − μ− π

b+
c(b)
Q(b)

Q(b) +
(σb)2
2
Q(b), (18)
for all b ∈ [0, b∗). To determine the boundary condition for Q(b), we calculate the expected value
of outstanding bonds at the time of default (T (b∗) = 0),
Q(b∗) = E0

e−r¯τθ
Yτ
Y0
Q (θb∗)

=
 ∞
0
χe−χτE0

e−r¯τθ
Yτ
Y0
Q (θb∗) |τ

dτ
=
 ∞
0
χe−(r¯+χ−μ)τθQ (θb∗) dτ =
χ
r¯ + χ− μθQ (θb
∗) , (19)
21The average recovery rate equals E

θYtˆ+τ/Ytˆ

= θEτ

E

Ytˆ+τ/Ytˆ | τ

= θ
∞
0
χe−χτeμτdτ = θχ/ (χ− μ),
where we have used E

Ytˆ+τ/Ytˆ | τ

= exp(μτ) and the fact that τ is exponentially distributed.
22Notice that the recovery payoff θ

YT (b∗)+τ/YT (b∗)

Q (θb∗) is discounted by exp{−λT (b∗) −  T (b∗)
0
πsds}, as
opposed to exp{−λ [T (b∗) + τ ] −  T (b∗)+τ
0
πsds}, because no principal is repaid and no inflation is created during
the exclusion period (of length τ).
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where in the third equality we have used E0

Yτ
Y0
|τ

= eμτ . The partial differential equation (18),
together with the boundary condition (19), provide the risk-neutral pricing of the nominal default-
able sovereign bond.23
2.5 Some definitions
Given a current bond price Q (b), the implicit bond yield r (b) is the discount rate for which
the discounted future promised cash flows from the bond equal its price. The discounted future
promised payments are
∞
0
e−(r(b)+λ)t (λ+ δ) dt = λ+δ
r(b)+λ . Therefore, the bond yield function is
r (b) =
λ+ δ
Q (b)
− λ. (20)
The gap between the yield r (b) and the riskless real rate r¯ reflects both (a) the risk of sovereign
default, i.e. a risk premium, and (b) the anticipation of inflation during the life of the bond,
i.e. an inflation premium. In order to disentangle both factors, we define the riskless yield as
r˜ (b) = λ+δ
Q˜(b)
− λ, where Q˜ (b) is the price that the investor would pay for a riskless nominal bond
with the same promised cash flows as the risky nominal bond. Appendix B defines Q˜ (b) and
explains how to solve for it. We then decompose
r (b)− r¯ = (r (b)− r˜ (b)) + (r˜ (b)− r¯) ,
where r (b)− r˜ (b) is the risk premium, and r˜ (b)− r¯ is the inflation premium. In the no inflation
regime, the riskless rate is simply r˜ (b) = r¯, the inflation premium is zero, and the risk premium is
r (b)− r¯.
Given the definition of the bond yield, the drift function of the state variable can be expressed
as
s (b) ≡

r (b)− π (b)− μ+ σ2

b+
c (b)
Q (b)
.
Notice that an important determinant of the drift is the difference between the nominal bond yield
and the instantaneous inflation rate, r (b)−π (b). We may refer to the latter as ex-post real interest
rate, or simply real interest rate.
Finally, we define the expected time to default, given a current debt ratio b, as
T e(b) ≡ E0 [T (b∗)|b0 = b] = E0
 T (b∗)
0
1dt | b0 = b

. (21)
23Again, there also exists the state constraint b ≥ 0.
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Appendix C shows how to compute T e(b) numerically.
2.6 Equilibrium
We define our equilibrium concept:
Definition 1 A Markov Perfect Equilibrium is an interval Φ = [0, b∗), a value function V : Φ→
R, a pair of policy functions c, π : Φ→ R and a bond price function Q : Φ→ R+ such that
1. Given prices Q, for any initial debt b0 ∈ Φ the value function V solves the government problem
(14), with boundary conditions ( 12) and ( 13); the optimal inflation is π, the optimal deficit
ratio is c, and the optimal debt threshold is b∗.
2. Given the optimal inflation π, deficit ratio c and the interval Φ, bond prices satisfy the pricing
equation (18).
The government takes the bond price as given and chooses inflation and deficit (continuous
policies) and default (stopping policy) to maximize its value function. The investors take these
policies as given and price government bonds accordingly.
3 Quantitative analysis
Having laid out our theoretical model, we now use it in order to analyze the trade-off between price
stability and the sustainability of sovereign debt. We are not able to find an analytical solution to
our model. Therefore we resort to numerical techniques. We next describe our solution algorithm.
3.1 Computational algorithm
Here we propose a computational algorithm aimed at finding the equilibrium. The structure of
the model complicates its solution as it comprises a pair of coupled ordinary difference equations
(ODEs): the HJB equation (14) and the bond pricing equation (18). The policies obtained from
the HJB are necessary to compute the bond prices and simultaneously, bond prices are necessary
to compute the drift in the HJB equation.
In order to solve the HJB and bond pricing equations, we employ an upwind finite difference
method.24 It approximates the value function V (b) and the bond price function Q(b) on a finite
grid with steps Δb: b ∈ {b1, ..., bI}, where bi = bi−1 + Δb = b1 + (i− 1)Δb for 2 ≤ i ≤ I, with
24Barles and Souganidis (1991) have proved how this method converges to the unique viscosity solution of the
problem. The latter is the appropriate concept of a general solution for stochastic optimal control problems (Crandall
and Lions, 1983; Crandall, Ishii and Lions, 1992).
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bounds b1 = 0 and bI+1 = b∗.25 We use the notation V
(n)
i ≡ V (n)(bi), i = 1, ..., I, where n = 0, 1, 2...
is the iteration counter, and analogously for Q(n)i .
In order to compute the numerical solution to the recursive competitive equilibrium we proceed
in three steps. We consider an initial guess of the bond price function, Q(0) ≡ {Q(0)i }Ii=1, and the
default threshold, b∗(0). Set n = 1. Then:
Step 1: Government problem. Given Q(n−1) and b∗(n−1), we solve the optimal stopping problem
with variable controls. This means solving the HJB equation (14) in the domain [0, b∗(n−1)]
imposing the smooth pasting condition (13) (but not the value matching condition) to obtain
an estimate of the value function V (n) ≡ {V (n)i }Ii=1 and of primary deficit and inflation,
c(n), π(n)

≡ {c(n)i , π(n)i }Ii=1.
Step 2: Investors problem. Given c(n), π(n) and b∗(n−1), solve the bond pricing equation (18)
and obtain Q(n) in the domain [0, b∗(n−1)]. Then iterate again on steps 1 and 2 until both the
value and bond price functions converge for given b∗(n−1).
Step 3: Optimal boundary. Given V (n) from step 2, we check whether the value matching con-
dition (12) is satisfied. We compute V (n)(b∗(n−1)) = V
(n)
I and V
(n)
def (b
∗
(n−1)) = −
max{0,b∗
(n−1)−bˆ}
ρ+χ +
χ
ρ+χV
(n)
θI . If V
(n)(b∗(n−1)) > V
(n)
def (b
∗
(n−1)), then increase the threshold to a new value b
∗
(n). If
V (n)(b∗(n−1)) < V
(n)
def (b
∗
(n−1)), then decrease the threshold. Set n := n + 1. Proceed again to
steps 1 and 2 until the value matching condition V (b∗) = Vdef (b∗) is satisfied.
Appendix A provides further details on these steps. The idea of the algorithm is to find the
equilibrium numerically by moving the default threshold b∗ and solving the HJB and bond pricing
equations. The algorithm stops when the value matching condition (12) is satisfied.
3.2 Calibration
Let the unit of time by 1 year, such that all rates are in annual terms. Most papers in the literature
on quantitative optimal sovereign default models set the world riskless real interest rate and the
subjective discount rate to 1% and 5% per quarter, respectively.26 We thus set r¯ = 0.04 and
ρ = 0.20 per year.
In order to calibrate the drift and volatility of the exogenous output process, we use annual
GDP growth data for the EMU periphery countries (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain) over
25We thus have Δb = b∗/I. We use I = 800 grid points in all our simulations.
26The world interest rate is set to 1% per quarter in Aguiar & Gopinath (2006), Benjamin and Wright (2009),
Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), Yue (2010), Mendoza and Yue (2012) and Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012). The
subjective discount rate is set equal to or close to 5% per quarter in Arellano (2008), Benjamin and Wright (2009),
Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), and Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012), and in Aguiar & Gopinath’s (2006) model
extension with bailouts.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 22 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1517
the period 1995-2012.27 Averaging the mean and standard deviation of GDP growth across these
countries, we obtain μ = 0.022 and σ = 0.032.
The bond amortization rate λ is such that the average Macaulay bond duration, 1/ (λ+ r¯), is
5 years, which is broadly consistent with international evidence on bond duration (see e.g. Cruces
et al. 2002). We set the coupon rate δ equal to r¯, such that the price of a riskless real bond,
(δ + λ) / (r¯ + λ), is normalized to 1.
We set χ such that the average duration of the exclusion period is 1/χ = 3 years, consistently
with international evidence on exclusion periods in Dias and Richmond (2007). The bond recovery
rate parameter, θ, is set such that the mean recovery rate, θχ/ (χ− μ), is 60%, consistent with
the evidence in Benjamin and Wright (2009) and Cruces and Trebesch (2011).
The parameters determining the output loss during the exclusion period, bˆ and ε, are set in
order for the model with zero inflation to replicate (i) the average ratio of external public debt over
GDP across EMU periphery economies in our sample period (35.6%) and (ii) an output decline of
6% following default.28 Regarding the latter, the literature offers a broad range of values, from 2%
(Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006) to 13-14% (Mendoza and Yue, 2012; Arellano, 2008). The midpoint
of this range would be 8%. We target a more conservative output loss of 6%.
Finally, in order to calibrate the government’s dislike for inflation, ψ, we turn to the inflationary
model regime and target an average inflation rate of 3.2%. The latter corresponds to the average
CPI inflation differential between the EMU periphery economies and the US during the period
1987-1997.29 We thus use observed inflation differentials in the years before the creation of EMU
in order to back up the preferences for inflation in such countries at a time when they were able
to issue debt in their own currency. Table 1 summarizes the calibration.
27See Appendix E for data sources and treatment.
28We use the no-inflation scenario as the model counterpart of our sample region and period (the average EMU
peripheral economy in the euro period). First, as discussed in section 2.3.3, the no-inflation regime can be interpreted
as an (anti-inflationary) monetary union. Second, as we explain below, we choose the US CPI as the empirical proxy
for the ‘World price’ in the model, which is furthermore normalized to 1. We thus use CPI inflation differentials
(rather than levels) relative to the US as the relevant empirical counterpart for inflation in the model. As we show in
section 3.4, the average inflation differential across EMU peripheral economies was close to zero (0.4% annual) in our
sample period, such that the no-inflation regime provides a good approximation for observed inflation differentials
in our sample.
29We thus take the US CPI as the proxy for the ’World price’ in the model. Notice also that, since the latter is
normalized to 1, we target inflation differentials as opposed to inflation levels.
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Table 1. Baseline calibration
Parameter Value Description Source/Target
r¯ 0.04 world real interest rate standard
ρ 0.20 subjective discount rate standard
μ 0.022 drift output growth average growth EMU periphery
σ 0.032 diffusion output growth growth volatility EMU periphery
λ 0.16 bond amortization rate Macaulay duration = 5 years
δ 0.04 bond coupon rate price of riskless real bond = 1
χ 0.33 reentry rate mean duration of exclusion = 3 years
θ 0.56 recovery rate parameter mean recovery rate = 60%
 1.50 default cost parameter output loss during exclusion = 6%
bˆ 0.332 default cost parameter average external debt/GDP ratio (35.6%)
ψ 9.15 inflation disutility parameter mean inflation rate (1987-1997) = 3.2%
3.3 Equilibrium
Inflationary equilibrium. The green dotted lines in Figure 1 show the equilibrium value function
and policy functions in the ’inflationary regime’. As shown by the upper left subplot, the value
function declines gently and almost linearly with the country’s debt burden, except for debt ratios
very close to default when the slope increases sharply. The optimal default threshold equals
b∗ = 37.0% and is marked by a green circle. At that point, the government defaults. Following
the exclusion period, it reenters capital markets with a debt ratio θb∗ = 20.7%.
As regards nominal bond prices, Q (b), their gap with respect to the price of a riskless real bond
(normalized to 1) reflects mainly expected inflation during the life of the bond as opposed to default
risk, except for debt ratios close to default. This can be seen more clearly in the second line of Figure
2, which displays how the gap between the nominal yield, r (b) = (δ + λ) /Q (b)−λ, and the riskless
real rate r¯ is decomposed between the risk and inflation premia, as defined in section 2.5. Indeed,
for all b except those very close to b∗, bond yields reflect mostly the inflation premium, rather
than the risk premium, because default is still perceived as a very distant outcome, as reflected
by an expected time-to-default of around 40 years. It is only as debt approaches the default
threshold that investors start perceiving default as rather imminent, demanding higher and higher
risk premia, which leads to the collapse of bond prices to their boundary value (Q(b∗) = 0.44).
The value function and bond prices, together with the state b, determine in turn the policy
functions for inflation and primary deficit, as described in equations (15) and (16). Regarding
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Figure 1: Equilibrium value function, bond price and policy functions.
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inflation, the government’s incentive to deflate debt away increase approximately linearly with the
debt ratio. This is because the value function is approximately linear, such that the welfare gain
per unit of debt reduction is roughly constant. However, in the vicinity of the default threshold, the
value function starts declining more and more steeply, such that a marginal reduction in the debt
ratio yields a higher and higher marginal gain in welfare.30 As a result, optimal inflation increases
steeply until reaching about 12% at the default threshold. Therefore, under discretion, the opti-
mal trade-off between price stability and sovereign debt sustainability prescribes a roughly linear
increase in inflation for moderate debt levels, and a strong increase as the economy approaches
default.
Finally, the primary deficit ratio declines too in an almost linear fashion, reflecting the gentle
decline in bond prices and the nearly constant slope of the value function. As debt approaches the
default threshold, however, the sharp decline in bond prices leads the government to drastically
reduce its primary deficit, which actually turns to surplus once the economy gets sufficiently close
to default.
No-inflation equilibrium. Consider now the equilibrium in the ’no-inflation regime’, depicted
by the solid blue lines in Figure 1. As explained in section 2.3.3, this scenario can be interpreted
as issuing foreign currency debt or joining a monetary union with a very strong anti-inflationary
commitment. Notice first that the optimal default threshold (b∗π=0 = 37.2%; see blue circles) is
essentially the same as in the baseline, inflationary regime. This means that the equilibrium range
of debt ratios is basically the same in both regimes. The first subplot of Figure 1 reveals our first
main result: the value function is higher under no inflation for any debt ratio, even when the
economy is close to default. A first and obvious reason is that the no inflation regime avoids the
direct welfare costs of inflation (ψ/2) π2. A second reason is the following. As shown in Figure
2, the no inflation regime reduces bond yields r (i.e. it lowers bond prices) by eliminating the
inflation premium. Lower bond prices lead the government to choose (slightly) higher primary
deficits, which allows for higher consumption given the exogenous output flow.
Notice that the no inflation regime raises risk premia vis-à-vis the inflationary regime. This
reflects the fact that default becomes more likely when the government gives up the ability to
use inflation so as to stabilize its debt. However, quantitatively the increase in risk premia is
very small, which together with the absence of inflation premia produces the reduction in bond
yields discussed above. The reason for such a small increase in risk premia is that, for all debt
ratios except those very close to b∗, default is still perceived as rather distant, as reflected by an
expected time to default of about 30 years. As a result, the fact investors expect default to happen
somewhat sooner than in the inflationary regime (by about 8 years) is not enough to raise risk
30The increase in the slope (in absolute value) of the value function is hard to appreciate in Figure 1, because it
only takes place at debt ratios very close to b∗. Zooming in the V (b) plot in the neighborhood of b∗ reveals clearly
such increase in the slope. The latter plot is available upon request.
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premia significantly.
In order to gain further understanding of why social welfare is higher under zero inflation for
any debt ratio, we decompose the value function into two components: V (b) = Vc (b) + Vπ (b),
where Vc (b) and Vπ (b) capture the contribution of consumption utility and inflation disutility,
respectively, to overall welfare (net of the autarky value). Notice that consumption utility (net of
exogenous (log)output) equals log(1+c (b)) when the country is in good credit and −max{0, b− bˆ}
while in exclusion. Likewise, inflation disutility equals −ψπ (b)2 /2 while in good credit and zero
during exclusion. We thus have
ρVc (b) = log(1 + c (b)) +

r (b)− π (b)− μ+ σ2

b+
c
Q(b)

V c (b) +
(σb)2
2
V c (b) ,
ρVπ (b) = −
ψ
2
π (b)2 +

r (b)− π (b)− μ+ σ2

b+
c
Q(b)

V π (b) +
(σb)2
2
V π (b) ,
for b < b∗, with respective boundary conditions
Vc (b
∗) = −max{0, b
∗ − bˆ}
ρ+ χ
+
χ
ρ+ χ
Vc (θb
∗) , Vπ (b
∗) =
χ
ρ+ χ
Vπ (θb
∗) (22)
Both value functions can be solved using numerical methods similar to those described in Appen-
dix A.31 Figure 3 shows the contribution of each component to overall welfare in each monetary
regime. The reduction in inflation disutility from giving up debt deflation is relatively large and in-
creases slightly with the debt ratio. As regards consumption utility, it contributes positively to the
welfare gap between the no-inflation and the inflationary regime at relatively low debt ratios, and
negatively in the vicinity of the default threshold. The reason is that, as the economy approaches
default, the ex-post real interest rate r (b)− π (b) increases under no inflation but decreases in the
inflationary regime, as shown in Figure 2. Ceteris paribus, this permits a lower drift and hence
a slower debt accumulation in the latter regime, which favors debt sustainability. Notice however
that, even when debt is close to b∗, the contribution of consumption utility is relatively similar
in both regimes. This is because, in the inflationary regime, the reduction in real interest rates
mentioned before is very weak, as the increase in instantaneous inflation is largely compensated
by the increase in nominal yields.
Figure 3 also reveals the following: the fact that the value function at the default threshold is
higher under no inflation is due entirely to the expected stream of inflation disutility flows at that
31Notice that, since we have already solved for the optimal default threshold b∗, we do not need to impose smooth
pasting conditions in order to solve for Vc (b) and Vπ (b).
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Figure 3: Welfare decomposition
point, Vπ (b∗). In both monetary regimes, the value function at default equals
V (b∗) = Vdef (b
∗) = −max{0, b
∗ − bˆ}
ρ+ χ
+
χ
ρ+ χ
V (θb∗) ,
which is precisely the sum of the two terminal values in (22). The fact that b∗ is very similar in
both cases implies that so is the output loss from default, max{0, b∗ − bˆ}, as is the debt ratio at
which the government reenters capital markets following the exclusion period (θb∗ = 20.7%, versus
θb∗π=0 = 20.8%).
32 However, at such reentry ratio the value function is higher in the no-inflation
regime, precisely because it avoids the welfare costs of inflation.
To summarize the previous discussion, the no-inflation regime achieves superior welfare out-
comes at any debt ratio. It does so by avoiding the temptation to inflate at points of the state
space where default is still perceived as rather distant, and hence where the stabilizing benefits
from deflating debt away are relatively minor. Even at debt ratios relatively close to default, the
gains from deflating debt away discretionarily are rather small, as the beneficial effects of higher
inflation on debt sustainability are mostly undone by the increase in nominal yields that goes hand
in hand with higher inflation expectations.
32Notice that b∗ > bˆ = 0.332 in both regimes. Thus, the loss in (log)output from default equals (b∗ − bˆ) in both
cases.
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3.4 Average performance
So far we have analyzed the equilibrium value function and policy functions, i.e. the optimal
choices of fiscal and monetary policy and the associated welfare at each point of the state space.
The main result from the previous section is that the no-inflation regime yields higher welfare at
any debt ratio, including at the respective default thresholds. This does not guarantee however
that average welfare would be higher too. Since value functions are monotonically decreasing in
both regimes, if the inflationary regime delivered sufficiently lower debt ratios most of the time, it
could also achieve higher average welfare.
In order to compute unconditional averages of welfare and other variables, we thus need to
solve for the stationary distribution of the state variable, the debt ratio. For this purpose, it is
useful to distinguish between (a) ’normal’ times in which the country is in good credit standing
and (b) the exclusion periods that follow each default. The stationary distribution conditional on
being in ’normal’ times, which we may denote by f(b), satisfies the following Kolmogorov Forward
Equation (KFE),
0 = − d
db


λ+ δ
Q(b)
+ σ2 − μ− λ− π(b)

b+
c(b)
Q(b)

f(b)

+
1
2
d2
db2

(σb)2 f(b)

+χhδ(b− θb∗)− χhδ(b− b∗), (23)
with the constraint 1 =
 b∗
0
f(b)db. In equation (23), the term χhδ(b − θb∗) reflects the fact
that, following an exclusion spell, the government reenters the capital market at a debt ratio
b = θb∗, where δ(·) is the Dirac ’delta’ and h is a function of the average time spent in exclusion.
Likewise, χhδ(b− b∗) captures the fact that at b = b∗ the government defaults and hence exits the
conditional distribution f(b). Appendix D provides further details on how to obtain equation (23)
and shows how to compute f(b) numerically, using an upwind finite difference scheme similar to
the one employed to solve for the value and bond price functions. Figure 4 displays the stationary
distributions of the debt ratio for both the baseline and the no-inflation regimes, conditional on
being in normal times. In the baseline regime, the possibility of using inflation to deflate debt away
allows the government to shift the debt distribution slightly to the left vis-à-vis the no-inflation
regime.
Conditional on being in an exclusion period, we have already seen that primary deficit and
inflation are both zero, ct = πt = 0. Since the rate at which the country reenters capital markets
is constant at χ and hence independent of the time elapsed since default, we have that the value
function and bond price are equal to their boundary values: Vt = V (b∗) = Vdef (b∗), Qt = Q (b∗).
Finally, we assume for simplicity that during the exclusion period the debt ratio is equal to b∗, i.e.
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Figure 4: Stationary distribution of debt ratio, f(b)
the ratio at which the country defaults.33
We can now compute the unconditional mean of each variable as the weighted average of the
conditional means, using as weights the average time spent in normal and exclusion periods. It
is relatively straightforward to show that the stationary probability of being in normal times and
in exclusion periods equal P [bt < b∗] = T
e(θb∗)
1/χ+T e(θb∗) and P [bt = b
∗] = 1/χ
1/χ+T e(θb∗) , respectively. Thus,
the unconditional mean of a variable xt equals
E [xt] = P [bt < b∗]E [xt|bt < b∗] + P [bt = b∗]x∗
=
T e(θb∗)
1/χ+ T e(θb∗)
 b∗
0
x (b) f(b)db+
1/χ
1/χ+ T e(θb∗)
x∗,
where x∗ is the value of xt during the exclusion period.34
Table 2 displays average values of key model variables for both monetary regimes, as well as
their corresponding empirical counterparts across EMU periphery countries.35 Notice first that,
33We are thus assuming that during the exclusion/renegotiation period nominal debt outstanding is adjusted at
each point in time to changes in the output endowment, such that the debt ratio is kept constant at b∗. We could
alternatively assume that, during the exclusion period, nominal debt outstanding is kept constant at its value at
the time of default (B∗
tˆ
), such that the debt ratio changes with the output endowment. This would complicate the
analysis while barely affecting the numerical results, given the relatively short average duration of the exclusion
period.
34As explained above, c∗ = 0, π∗ = 0, V ∗ = V (b∗), and Q∗ = Q (b∗).
35All data are annual except bond yields and risk premia which are quarterly and annualized. We stop the sample
for yields and risk premia in 2012:Q2 (included) in order to isolate our analysis from the effects of the annoucement
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remarkably, the model with no inflation replicates almost exactly the average bond risk premium
(154 bp) conditional on being in good credit standing (b < b∗). In the inflationary regime, average
bond yields (net of r¯ = 400 bp) while still in the market equal 446 bp, which reflects mostly average
inflation premia (309 bp) rather than average risk premia (137 bp). They are also significantly
higher than average yields under no inflation.
Table 2. Averages values
Data Model
1995-2012 No inflation Inflationary
units b < b∗ uncond. b < b∗ uncond.
debt-to-GDP, b % 35.6 35.6 35.8 35.6 35.7
primary deficit ratio, c % 4.1 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
inflation, π % 0.4 0 0 3.2 2.9
bond yields (net of r¯), r − r¯ bp 187 153 315 446 596
risk premium, r − r˜ bp 154 153 315 137 297
inflation premium, , r˜ − r¯ bp 33 0 0 309 299
Exp. time to default, T e years - 29.5 - 37.1 -
Welfare loss, V − Vπ=0 % cons. - 0 0 -0.27 -0.26
Note: Data from IMF, national accounts, and Bloomberg. All data are annual except bond yields and risk
premia which are quarterly (annualized) and run through 2012:Q2. See Data Appendix for details. The German
10-year bond yield is used as empirical proxy for the riskless bond yield, r˜. The column labelled ’b < b∗’ displays
results conditional on not being in exclusion, the column labelled ’uncond.’ displays fully unconditional results.
Welfare losses are relative to the no-inflation regime and are expressed in % of permanent consumption.
Interestingly, the fact that the no-inflation regime delivers lower average yields than the in-
flationary regime rationalizes the observed reduction in average sovereign yields across the EMU
periphery brought about by the creation of the eurozone, if one interprets both regimes as the
model counterparts of the EMU and pre-EMU periods respectively. Indeed, average yields on
10-year peripheral bonds decreased from 12.84% in the period 1987-94 to 5.87% in 1995-2012.36
Viewed through the lens of our model, this suggests that, when these countries decided to re-
nounce the ability to deflate their debts by joining EMU, the reduction in inflation expectations
was a more important factor in investors’ pricing of the new euro-denominated bonds than the
presumable increase in default risk.
From a welfare perspective, we find that average welfare is lower in the inflationary regime,
by the European Central Bank of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme in the summer of 2012.
36Notice that r = 5.87% = (r − r˜) + (r˜ − r¯) + r¯ = 1.54% + 0.33% + 4%.
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i.e. when the government deflates away its debt at discretion. The average welfare losses vis-
à-vis the no-inflation regime are equivalent to a reduction in permanent consumption of almost
0.3%. Therefore, the leftward shift in the debt distribution shown in Figure 4 is not sufficient to
compensate for the fact that the value function is lower at any debt ratio. Such a small shift in
the debt distribution reflects the low effectiveness of discretionary debt deflation policies in our
framework. Notice that optimal instantaneous inflation is relatively high in the range where the
debt distribution accumulates more density, i.e. for b > 0.35.37 However, this is largely undone by
the increase in nominal yields that goes along with higher inflation expectations. As a result, in
the relevant debt range the inflationary regime achieves only marginally lower real interest rates,
and hence only marginally slower debt accumulation, relative to the no inflation regime.
4 Robustness
We now evaluate the robustness of our main results to alternative calibrations. We will focus on
five structural parameters: (i) the amortization rate λ, (ii) the bond recovery parameter θ, (iii)
the default cost parameter bˆ, (iv) the scale parameter of inflation disutility ψ, and (v) the reentry
rate into capital markets, χ.
Bond duration. The amortization rate λ determines the average Macaulay bond duration,
1/ (λ+ r¯), for given riskless real return r¯. Table 3 displays averages of a number of key variables
for bond durations of 3 and 7 years, both for the no-inflation and the baseline inflationary regimes.
For comparison, it also displays the same statistics for the benchmark calibration, with a 5-year
bond duration. We find that average welfare continues to be higher in the no-inflation regime. The
welfare loss from using discretionary inflation decreases with bond duration. Intuitively, longer
bond durations give more stability to the debt ratio, thus reducing the need to use debt deflation.
This allows to reduce inflation premia in bond yields and direct utility costs, and hence the welfare
loss relative to the no-inflation case.
Bond recovery rate. The bond recovery parameter, θ, controls the average bond recovery rate
after default, θχ/ (χ− μ), for given reentry and trend growth rates (χ,μ). Table 3 displays results
for average recovery rates of 50% and 70% (the benchmark calibration is 60%). Again, average
welfare is higher if the government renounces the possibility to deflate debt away. In this case,
the welfare gains are fairly similar across different calibrations. As in the baseline calibration, the
reduction in average inflation premia from giving up debt deflation clearly dominates the increase
in average risk premia.
Output loss from default. Parameter bˆ controls the loss in (log-)output following default,
max{0, b∗ − bˆ}, for given scale parameter  and equilibrium default threshold b∗. We consider
37As shown in Figure 1, for b > 0.35 inflation is above 3%, with a maximum of around 12% in the limit as b→ b∗.
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values of bˆ such that, in equilibrium, output declines by 3.5% and 7% upon default (compared
to the benchmark 6% loss). In this case, the welfare gains from not deflating debt away, while
positive, seem more sensitive to the size of output losses associated to default. The reason is the
following. In our model, a positive relationship exists between bˆ and average debt ratios. There-
fore, higher values of bˆ imply higher debt on average and therefore a stronger incentive to deflate
the latter away. Higher average inflation in turn raises inflation premia and direct utility costs,
thus increasing the welfare gap with respect to the no-inflation scenario.
Inflation disutility-average inflation. In our baseline calibration exercise, we set the scale para-
meter of inflation disutility, ψ, in order for the inflationary model regime to replicate the inflation
record in our target economies (see section 3.2). This delivered a baseline value of ψ = 9.15, which
produced an average inflation of 3.2% conditional on being in good credit standing, and 2.9%
including exclusion spells. We now consider values of ψ that deliver average inflation rates of 2%
and 4%. We find that renouncing debt deflation continues to dominate in welfare terms, with the
welfare gap decreasing with the scale of inflation disutility. Intuitively, higher inflation costs lowers
the incentive to deflate debt in the inflationary regime, thus reducing the direct welfare costs and
the increase in nominal yields associated to the latter regime.
Duration of exclusion period. The reentry rate χ determines the average duration of the ex-
clusion periods following default, 1/χ, set to 3 years in our benchmark calibration. We study the
effects of considering average durations of 2 and 5 years. In addition, we consider the relatively
extreme case of a 40-year duration, which approximates the case of a permanent autarky following
default. Table 3 reveals that our benchmark results remain mostly unchanged, even for quasi-
permanent exclusion from capital markets. As we saw in the previous section, the welfare gap
between both monetary regimes depends not so much on what happens in exclusion (during which
output losses are fairly similar and inflation is zero in both cases), but on what happens while in
good credit standing. As a result, changes in duration of the exclusion period do not significantly
alter the welfare gap between both regimes.
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Table 3. Robustness analysis
Welfare Prim. deficit Inflation Nominal yield Risk Inflation Exp. time to
% cons. ratio, % % net of r¯, bp prem., bp prem., bp default, years
Benchmark
No inflation 0 0.5 0 153 153 0 29.5
Inflationary -0.26 0.4 2.9 446 137 309 37.1
Difference 0.26 0.1 -2.9 -294 16 -309 -7.7
Average bond duration = 3 years
No inflation 0.08 0.2 0 111 111 0 40.4
Inflationary -0.35 0.2 3.3 448 106 342 47.4
Difference 0.43 0.0 -3.3 -336 6 -342 -6.9
Average bond duration = 7 years
No inflation -0.01 0.6 0 173 173 0 26.0
Inflationary -0.16 0.5 2.7 433 148 286 34.7
Difference 0.15 0.1 -2.7 -260 25 -286 -8.7
Bond recovery rate = 50%
No inflation -0.05 0.6 0 174 174 0 30.8
Inflationary -0.30 0.5 3.0 466 154 312 38.6
Difference 0.25 0.1 -3.0 -292 20 -312 -7.9
Bond recovery rate = 70%
No inflation 0.06 0.3 0 129 129 0 28.3
Inflationary -0.22 0.2 2.9 425 118 307 35.8
Difference 0.27 0.1 -2.9 -296 11 -307 -7.5
Default costs = 3.5% of GDP
No inflation 0.48 0.6 0 152 152 0 29.8
Inflationary 0.38 0.5 1.8 329 142 187 34.5
Difference 0.09 0.1 -1.8 -176 11 -187 -4.7
Default costs = 7% of GDP
No inflation -0.19 0.4 0 152 152 0 29.6
Inflationary -0.54 0.3 3.4 491 135 356 38.4
Difference 0.35 0.1 -3.4 -339 17 -356 -8.8
Note: Welfare is calculated with respect to the no-inflation scenario under the benchmark calibration, and it is
expressed in % of permanent consumption. Average values are unconditional for welfare, deficit and inflation; for
all other variables, averages are conditional on not being in exclusion (b < b∗). Benchmark calibration: average
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bond duration = 5 years, bond recovery rate = 60%, default cost = 6% of GDP
Table 3 (cont’d). Robustness analysis
Welfare Prim. deficit Inflation Nominal yield Risk Inflation Exp. Time to
% cons. ratio, % % net of r¯, bp prem., bp prem., bp default, years
Scale inflation disutility ψ = 6.40 (average inflation = 4%)
No inflation 0 0.5 0 153 153 0 29.5
Inflationary -0.34 0.4 4.0 551 133 419 40.0
Difference 0.34 0.1 -4.0 -398 20 -419 -10.6
Scale inflation disutility ψ = 13.99 (average inflation = 2%)
No inflation 0 0.5 0 153 153 0 29.5
Inflationary -0.18 0.4 2.0 352 142 210 34.6
Difference 0.18 0.1 -2.0 -199 11 -210 -5.1
Average duration of exclusion period = 2 years
No inflation -0.11 0.5 0 181 181 0 23.6
Inflationary -0.36 0.4 3.0 477 160 316 29.6
Difference 0.25 0.1 -3.0 -296 20 -316 -6.0
Average duration of exclusion period = 5 years
No inflation 0.09 0.4 0 127 127 0 39.0
Inflationary -0.18 0.3 2.8 420 116 304 49.2
Difference 0.27 0.1 -2.8 -293 11 -304 -10.2
Average duration of exclusion period = 40 years
No inflation 0.12 0.6 0 126 126 0 74.3
Inflationary -0.13 0.5 2.1 409 115 294 93.2
Difference 0.25 0.1 -2.1 -283 12 -294 -19.0
Note: Welfare is calculated with respect to the no-inflation scenario under the benchmark calibration, and it
is expressed in % of permanent consumption. Average values are unconditional for welfare, deficit and inflation;
for all other variables, averages are conditional on not being in exclusion (b < b∗). Benchmark calibration: scale
inflation disutility ψ = 9.15, average duration of exclusion period = 3 years
Importantly, as in the case of the baseline calibration, the welfare gap between the no-inflation
and inflationary regimes takes place not only on average, but also state by state. Appendix F
displays the value functions in both regimes for each of the calibrations considered in Table 3. As
we show there, both value functions never cross for any of the cases considered.
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5 Monetary policy delegation
So far we have compared two alternative scenarios. In the baseline inflationary regime, a benevolent
government maximizes social welfare taking into account households’ preferences towards inflation,
where such preferences are calibrated to match the observed inflation performance in the EMU
peripheral economies in the pre-EMU period. In the ’no inflation’ regime, the government, aware
of its inability to make inflation commitments, effectively renounces its ability to deflate debt
away. Under our baseline calibration for the relative weight on inflation disutility in households’
preferences, ψ, we have found that giving up such discretionary stabilization tool actually increases
welfare. As explained in section 2.3.3, such a scenario can be interpreted as the government issuing
foreign currency debt, or joining a monetary union with a very strong anti-inflationary stance. We
also argued that one could view the ’no inflation’ regime as a situation in which the government
appoints an independent central banker with an extremely great distaste for inflation.
In this section, we consider an intermediate arrangement by which the government delegates
(discretionary) monetary policy to an independent central banker whose distaste for inflation is
greater than that of society, but not so extreme as to imply zero inflation at all times. The question
here is whether one can find intermediate preferences towards inflation that achieve better welfare
outcomes than the two regimes considered thus far.
Formally, our maximization problem is modified as follows. On the one hand, the benevolent
government retains the primary deficit and default decisions, taking as given the inflation policy
function of the independent monetary authority, which we denote by π˜(b). With a slight abuse of
notation, let V (b) denote the value function of the government when the latter no longer chooses
inflation. The corresponding HJB equation is
ρV (b) = max
c,b∗

log(1 + c)− ψ
2
π˜(b)2 +

r (b) + σ2 − μ− π˜(b)

b+
c
Q(b)

V (b) +
(σb)2
2
V (b)

,
(24)
where the value matching and smooth pasting conditions are given again by equations (12) and
(13), respectively.38 The optimal primary deficit ratio is given again by equation (15). Investors’
bond pricing schedule Q(b) is determined exactly as before.
The monetary authority chooses inflation taking as given the government’s primary deficit
policy, c (b), and optimal default threshold, b∗. Letting V˜ (b) denote the monetary authority’s
38In equation (24), we have used the definition of the bond yield r (b) (equation 20) for compactness.
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value function, the latter satisfies the following HJB equation,
ρV˜ (b) = max
π

log(1 + c (b))− ψ˜
2
π2 +

r (b) + σ2 − μ− π

b+
c (b)
Q(b)

V˜ (b) +
(σb)2
2
V˜ (b)

,
(25)
where ψ˜ ≥ ψ captures the central banker’s distaste for inflation. V˜ also satisfies a value matching
condition analogous to (12). The optimal inflation decision is given by equation (16) with ψ˜ and
V˜  replacing and ψ and V , which defines the new inflation policy function π˜(b). Notice that
limψ˜→∞ π˜(b) = 0 for all b. Thus, as argued in section 2.3.3, the ’no inflation’ regime can be viewed
as an extreme case of the independent central banker problem laid out here, in which the latter
has an arbitrarily great distaste for inflation.
In order to solve this problem we need to extend the numerical algorithm introduced in section
3.1. In particular, we replace the government problem (step 1) by:
Step 1a: Government problem. Given Q(n−1), π(n−1) and b∗(n−1), we solve the HJB equation
(24) in the domain [0, b∗(n−1)] imposing the smooth pasting condition (13) to obtain an esti-
mate of the government’s value function V (n) and of primary deficit c(n).
Step 1b: Central bank problem. Given Q(n−1), c(n) and b∗(n−1), we solve the HJB equation (25)
in the domain [0, b∗(n−1)] imposing the smooth pasting condition (13) to obtain an estimate
of the central bank’s value function V˜ (n) and of inflation π(n).
Figure 5 displays the unconditional means of social welfare and other relevant variables as we
vary the conservative central banker’s distaste for inflation, ψ˜.39 The main message is that average
social welfare increases monotonically with the inflation conservatism of the delegated monetary
authority, but it is always lower than that achieved in the no-inflation regime, which is reached
only asymptotically (ψ˜ → ∞).
To understand this result, the figure also displays the contribution of consumption utility and
inflation disutility to average welfare. On the one hand, central bank conservativeness reduces the
average welfare due to consumption. Intuitively, the economy is more likely to default and hence
to incur output losses when the monetary authority is more focused on stabilizing inflation. On
the other hand, central bank conservativeness also reduces the average welfare costs of inflation. In
fact, the latter effect clearly outweighs the first one, which explains the increase in overall welfare.
Interestingly, we also find that a more conservative monetary authority reduces average nominal
interest rates, reflecting once again the fact the ensuing reduction in average inflation premia
39To facilitate interpretation, the x-axes in Figure 5 display the central banker’s distaste for inflation relative to
that of society, ψ˜/ψ, where ψ is held constant at its calibrated value (see Table 1). Thus ψ˜/ψ = 1 represents our
baseline ’inflationary regime’ in which inflation is chosen by the benevolent government.
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Figure 5: Effect of central bank conservatism under monetary policy delegation (average values).
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dominates the increase in average risk premia. Beyond a certain degree of conservativeness, it
also reduces average real interest rates, as the reduction in average yields outpaces that in average
inflation.
To summarize our results in this section, we find that if the government is unable to make cred-
ible commitments, delegating monetary policy to an independent, relatively conservative central
banker achieves better welfare outcomes by reducing current and expected inflation. However, such
an institutional solution continues to be dominated by a scenario in which the government fully
renounces the ability to deflate debt away, as would be exemplified e.g. by issuing foreign currency
debt or joining a monetary union with a very strong and credible anti-inflationary mandate.
6 Conclusions
Motivated by the recent debt crisis in the EMU periphery, in this paper we have analyzed the
trade-offs between price stability and the sustainability of sovereign debt. We have done so in
the context of a continuous-time, small open economy model where a benevolent government
issues nominal defaultable debt to foreign investors. The government is assumed to be unable
to make credible commitments regarding fiscal policy (including the possibility of defaulting on
sovereign debt) and monetary policy. At each point in time the government optimally chooses
primary deficit and inflation, and whether to default or not. A main theme of our paper is to
compare this situation with an alternative scenario in which the government effectively renounces
the option to deflate debt away, e.g. by issuing foreign currency debt or joining an anti-inflationary
monetary union. In our quantitative exploration, the government’s inflation tolerance is calibrated
to replicate observed inflation differentials in the EMU periphery before the start of the euro.
We have found that giving up the option to deflate debt away achieves higher welfare (both at
any debt ratio and on average) than retaining such discretionary adjustment margin. The reason
lies in the costs and benefits of discretionary inflation. On the one hand, inflation allows reducing
the real value of nominal debt (debt deflation effect) and thus making it more sustainable ceteris
paribus, with the resulting reduction in risk premia. On the other hand, inflation creates direct
welfare costs. Moreover, (expected) inflation raises the inflation premium that the government
must offer in new bond issuances. In equilibrium, the latter effect clearly dominates the reduction
in risk premia, thus producing an increase in bond yields that essentially undoes the debt deflation
effect. As a result, the welfare costs of inflation dominate its benefits.
Our results thus qualify the conventional wisdom that national governments should benefit from
retaining the possibility of deflating away their sovereign debt, in the sense that such a benefit
may not materialize if such governments are unable to make credible commitments about its
future monetary policy. This qualification may be particularly relevant for most EMU peripheral
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economies, in view of their inflation record (relative e.g. to that of Germany) in the decades prior
to joining the euro.
Looking ahead, we note that we have analyzed the problem of a single government in a small
open economy setup. Given our interest in recent developments in the euro area, we believe that
extending the analysis presented here to the case of a monetary union with a common monetary
authority and many national fiscal authorities that differ in their outstanding sovereign debt levels
is of great importance. We leave this task for future research.
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Appendix
A. Numerical algorithm
We describe the numerical algorithm used to jointly solve for the equilibrium value function, V (b),
and bond price function, Q (b). The algorithm proceeds in 3 steps. We describe each step in turn.
Step 1: Solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
The HJB equation (14) is solved using an upwind finite difference scheme following Achdou et al.
(2014). It approximates the value function V (b) on a finite grid with step Δb : b ∈ {b1, ..., bI},
where bi = bi−1+Δb = b1+(i− 1)Δb for 2 ≤ i ≤ I. The bounds are b1 = 0 and bI = b∗−Δb, such
that Δb = b∗/I. We choose θ such that θ (I + 1) ∈ N. We use the notation Vi ≡ V (bi), i = 1, ..., I,
and similarly for the bond price function Qi and the policy functions (πi, ci).
Notice first that the HJB equation involves first and second derivatives of the value function,
V (b) and V (b). At each point of the grid, the first derivative can be approximated with a forward
(F ) or a backward (B) approximation,
V (bi) ≈ ∂FVi ≡
Vi+1 − Vi
Δb
, (26)
V (bi) ≈ ∂BVi ≡
Vi − Vi−1
Δb
, (27)
whereas the second derivative is approximated by
V (bi) ≈ ∂bbVi ≡
Vi+1 + Vi−1 − 2Vi
(Δb)2
. (28)
In an upwind scheme, the choice of forward or backward derivative depends on the sign of the drift
function for the state variable, given by
s (b) ≡


λ+ δ
Q (b)
+ σ2 − μ− λ− π (b)

b+
c (b)
Q (b)
, (29)
for b ≤ b∗, where
c (b) = −Q(b)
V (b)
− 1,
π (π) = − b
ψ
V (b) =
bQ(b)
ψ (1 + c)
.
Let superscript n denote the iteration counter. The HJB equation is approximated by the following
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upwind scheme,
V n+1i − V ni
Δ
+ρV n+1i = log(c
n
i +1)−
ψ
2
(πni )
2+∂FV
n+1
i s
n
i,F1sni,F>0+∂BV
n+1
i s
n
i,B1sni,B<0+
(σbi)
2
2
∂bbV
n+1
i ,
for i = 1, ..., I, where 1 (·) is the indicator function and
sni,F =


λ+ δ
Qi
+ σ2 − μ− λ+ bi
ψ
∂FV
n
i

bi −


1
∂FV ni
+
1
Qi

,
sni,B =


λ+ δ
Qi
+ σ2 − μ− λ+ bi
ψ
∂BV
n
i

bi −


1
∂BV ni
+
1
Qi

.
Therefore, when the drift is positive (sni,F > 0) we employ a forward approximation of the derivative,
∂FV
n+1
i ; when it is negative (s
n
i,B < 0) we employ a backward approximation, ∂BV
n+1
i . The term
V n+1i −V ni
Δ → 0 as V
n+1
i → V ni . Moving all terms involving V n+1 to the left hand side and the rest
to the right hand side, we obtain
V n+1i−1 α
n
i + V
n+1
i β
n
i + V
n+1
i+1 ξ
n
i = log(c
n
i + 1)−
ψ
2
(πni )
2 +
V ni
Δ
, (30)
where
αni ≡
sni,B1sni,B<0
Δb
− (σbi)
2
2 (Δb)2
,
βni ≡
1
Δ
+ ρ+
sni,F1sni,F>0
Δb
−
sni,B1sni,B<0
Δb
+
(σbi)
2
(Δb)2
,
ξni ≡ −
sni,F1sni,F>0
Δb
− (σbi)
2
2 (Δb)2
,
for i = 1, ..., I. Notice that the state constraint b ≥ 0 means that sn1,B = 0, which together with
b1 = 0 implies αn1 = 0. In equation (30), the optimal primary deficit ratio is set to
cni =


−Qni
∂V ni
− 1

, (31)
where
∂Vi = ∂FVi1sni,F>0 + ∂BVi1sni,B<0 −
Q(bi)
1 + c¯i
1sni,F≤01sni,B≥0.
In the above expression, c¯i is the consumption level such that s (bi) ≡ sni = 0, i.e. it solves


λ+ δ
Qi
+ σ2 − μ− λ− biQi
ψ (1 + c¯i)

bi +
c¯i
Qi
= 0.
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The solution is the higher root of the above equation,
c¯i =
− (1 + ΓiQi) +
!
(1 + ΓiQi)
2 − 4

ΓiQi − b
2
iQ
2
i
ψ

2
,
where Γi ≡

λ+δ
Q(bi)
+ σ2 − μ− λ
	
bi. Given cni , the optimal inflation rate is
πni =
bQi
ψ (1 + cni )
. (32)
The smooth pasting boundary condition (equation 13) can be approximated by40
V n+1I+1 − V n+1I
Δb
= − 
χ+ ρ
+
χ
χ+ ρ
θ∂FV
n
θ(I+1) ⇒ V n+1I+1 = V n+1I +


− 
χ+ ρ
+
χ
χ+ ρ
θ∂FV
n
θ(I+1)

Δb.
(33)
Equation (30) is a system of I linear equations which can be written in matrix notation as:
AnVn+1 = dn, (34)
where the matrix An and the vectors Vn+1 and dn are defined by
An =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
βn1 ξ
n
1 0 0 · · · 0
αn2 β
n
2 ξ
n
2 0 · · · 0
0 αn3 β
n
3 ξ
n
3 · · · 0
...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 · · · αnI−1 βnI−1 ξnI−1
0 0 · · · 0 αnI βnI + ξnI
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, Vn+1 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
V n+11
V n+12
V n+13
...
V n+1I−1
V n+1I
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(35)
dn =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
log(cn1 + 1)− ψ2 (π
n
1 )
2 +
V n1
Δ
log(cn2 + 1)− ψ2 (π
n
2 )
2 +
V n2
Δ
log(cn3 + 1)− ψ2 (π
n
3 )
2 +
V n3
Δ
...
log(cn
I−1
+ 1)− ψ
2

πn
I−1
	2
+
V n
I−1
Δ
log(cn
I
+ 1)− ψ
2

πn
I
2
+
V nI
Δ + ξ
n
I


χ+ρ −
χ
χ+ρθ∂FV
n
θ(I+1)
	
Δb
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Notice that the element (I, I) in A is βnI + ξ
n
I due to the smooth pasting condition (33).
40Notice that we solve for the value function under the guess that the optimal default threshold satisfies b∗ > bˆ,
such that max{0, b∗ − bˆ} = b∗ − bˆ. We verify that our guess is satisfied in equilibrium in all our simulations.
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The algorithm to solve the HJB equation runs as follows. Begin with an initial guess V 0i = −bi,
i = 1, ..., I. Set n = 0. Then:
1. Compute ∂FV ni , ∂BV
n
i and ∂bbV
n
i using (26)-(28).
2. Compute cni and π
n
i using (31) and (32).
3. Find V n+1i solving the linear system of equations (34).
4. If V n+1i is close enough to V
n
i , stop. If not set n := n+ 1 and go to 1.
Step 2: Solution to the Bond Pricing Equation
The pricing equation (18) is also solved using an upwind finite difference scheme. The equation in
this case is
Q(b) (r¯ + π(b) + λ) = (λ+ δ) +


λ+ δ
Q(b)
+ σ2 − μ− λ− π(b)

b+
c(b)
Q(b)

Q(b) +
(σb)2
2
Q(b),
with a boundary condition
Q(b∗) =
χ
r¯ − μ+ χθQ(θb
∗).
This case is similar to the HJB equation. Using the notation Qi = Q(bi), the equation can be
expressed as
Qn+1i −Qni
Δ
+Qn+1i (r¯ + πi + λ) = λ+ δ + ∂FQ
n+1
i s
n
i,F1sni,F>0 + ∂BQ
n+1
i s
n
i,B1sni,B<0 +
(σbi)
2
2
∂bbQ
n+1
i ,
(36)
where:
Q(bi) ≈ ∂FQi ≡
Qi+1 −Qi
Δb
,
Q(bi) ≈ ∂BQi ≡
Qi −Qi−1
Δb
,
Q(bi) ≈ ∂bbQi ≡
Qi+1 +Qi−1 − 2Qi
(Δb)2
and rearranging terms
Qn+1i−1 α
n
i +Q
n+1
i (β
n
i + r¯ + πi + λ− ρ) +Qn+1i+1 ξni = λ+ δ +
Qni
Δ
, ∀i < I + 1,
QI+1 =
χ
ρ− μ+ χθQ(θ (I + 1)).
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Notice the abuse of notation, as
sni,F = s
n
i,B = s
n
i =


λ+ δ
Qn(bi)
+ σ2 − μ− λ− πi

bi +
ci
Qn(bi)
.
Equation (36) is again a system of I linear equations which can be written in matrix notation
as:
FnQn+1 = qn, (37)
where the matrix Fn and the vectors Qn+1 and fn are defined by:
Fn =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(βn1 + π1
+λ+ r¯ − ρ)
ξn1 0 · · · 0
αn2
(βn2 + π2
+λ+ r¯ − ρ)
ξn2 · · · 0
0 αn3
(βn3 + π3
+λ+ r¯ − ρ)
· · · 0
...
. . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 · · · (β
n
I−1 + πI−1
+λ+ r¯ − ρ)
ξnI−1
0 0 · · · αnI
(βnI + πI
+λ+ r¯ − ρ)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
Qn+1 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Qn+11
Qn+12,1
Qn+13,1
...
Qn+1I−1
Qn+1I
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, qn =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
λ+ δ + Q
n
1
Δ
λ+ δ + Q
n
2
Δ
λ+ δ + Q
n
3
Δ
...
λ+ δ +
Qn
I−1
Δ
λ+ δ +
Qn
I
Δ − ξ
n
I
χ
ρ−μ+χθQ
n
θ(I+1)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
The algorithm to solve the bond pricing equation is similar to the HJB. Begin with an initial
guess Q0i =
λ+δ
r¯+λ , set n = 0. Then:
1. Find Qn+1i solving the linear system of equations (37).
2. If Qn+1i is close enough to Q
n
i , stop. If not set n := n+ 1 and go to 1.
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Step 3: Value Matching
Finally, we iterate until the value matching condition (12) is satisfied:
VI+1 = −
max

0, bI+1 − bˆ
 
ρ+ χ
+
χ
χ+ ρ
Vθ(I+1). (38)
Taking into account (33), condition (38) can be rewritten as
VI +


− 
χ+ ρ
+
χ
χ+ ρ
θ∂FVθ(I+1)

Δb+
max

0, bI+1 − bˆ
 
ρ+ χ
− χ
χ+ ρ
Vθ(I+1) = 0.
B. The riskless nominal bond
We define a new instrument, a riskless nominal bond. This is a non-defaultable bond issued in the
domestic currency. In this case, the nominal price of the bond for a current debt ratio b ≤ b∗ is
given by
Q˜(b) = E
⎡
⎣
 T (b∗)
0
e−(r¯+λ)t−
 t
0
πsds (λ+ δ) dt
+
 T (b∗)+τ
T (b∗) e
−(r¯+λ)t−
 T (b∗)
0
πsds (λ+ δ) dt+ e−(r¯+λ)(T (b
∗)+τ)−
 T (b∗)
0
πsdsQ˜ (θb∗) |b0 = b
⎤
⎦ .
Applying again the Feynman-Kac formula, we obtain
Q˜(b) (r¯ + π(b) + λ) = (λ+ δ) +


λ+ δ
Q(b)
+ σ2 − μ− λ− π

b+
c(b)
Q(b)

Q˜(b) +
(σb)2
2
Q˜(b),
for all b ∈ [0, b∗). The boundary condition for Q˜(b) is given by
Q˜(b∗) = E
 τ
0
e−(r¯+λ)t (λ+ δ) dt+ e−(r¯+λ)τ Q˜ (θb∗)

=
 ∞
0
χe−χτ

1− e−(r¯+λ)τ
 λ+ δ
r¯ + λ
dt+ e−(r¯+λ)τ Q˜ (θb∗)

dτ
=
λ+ δ
r¯ + χ+ λ
+
χ
r¯ + χ+ λ
Q˜ (θb∗) .
Given the equilibrium default threshold b∗, we solve for the riskless bond price function Q˜(b) using
a finite difference scheme similar to the one used to solve forQ(b) in Step 2 of the general algorithm.
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C. Computing the expected time-to-default
Given the definition of the expected time to default (21), applying the Feynman-Kac formula we
obtain
1 +


λ+ δ
Q(b)
+ σ2 − μ− λ− π

b+
c
Q(b)

T e(b) +
(σb)2
2
T e(b) = 0,
with a boundary condition
T e(b∗) = 0.
This can be solved using a finite difference scheme similar to the one described for the bond
price in Appendix A.
D. Solution to the Kolmogorov Forward equation
Let f˜(b) denote the stationary share of time spent at debt ratio b while in good credit standing.
It satisfies the following Kolmogorov Forward equation:
0 = − d
db

s(b)f˜(b)

+
1
2
d2
db2

(σb)2 f˜(b)

+ χh˜δ(b− θb∗)− χh˜δ(b− b∗), (39)
subject to
1 =
 b∗
0
f˜(b)db+ h˜,
where s(b) is the drift function given by (29), h˜ is the stationary share of time spent in exclusion,
h˜ ≡ E0 [τ ]
E0 [τ + T (b∗)|b0 = θb∗] =
1/χ
1/χ+ T e(θb∗)
,
and δ(·) is the Dirac ’delta’.41 In equation (39), the term χh˜δ(b − θb∗) reflects the fact that the
government reenters capital markets at b = θb∗ following exclusion spells, on which it spends a
fraction h˜ of time and from which it exits at rate χ. Similarly, the term χh˜δ(b− b∗) captures the
fact that at b = b∗ the government defaults and hence exits the repayment spell; in the latter term,
we use the fact that, in the ergodic limit, the flow of transitions from repayment to exclusion spells
must equal the flow of transitions from exclusion to repayments spells, χh˜. We define f(b) ≡ f˜(b)
1−h˜ ,
41The Dirac delta is a distribution or generalized function such that δ [f ] =
 ε
−ε f(x)δ (x) dx = f(0), ∀ε > 0,
f ∈ L1 (−ε, ε). A heuristic characterization is the following:
 ∞
∞
δ (x) dx = 1,
δ (x) =

∞, x = 0,
0, x = 0.
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which denotes the distribution of the debt ratio conditional on being in good credit standing. We
also define h ≡ h˜
1−h˜ . Equation (39) can then be written as,
0 = − d
db


λ+ δ
Q(b)
+ σ2 − μ− λ− π(b)

b+
c(b)
Q(b)

f(b)

+
1
2
d2
db2

(σb)2 f(b)

+χhδ(b− θb∗)− χhδ(b− b∗),
where now
1 =
 b∗
0
f(b)db.
We solve the above equation using an upwind finite difference scheme as in Achdou et al. (2014)
or Nuño and Moll (2015). We use the notation fi ≡ f(bi). The system can be now expressed as
0 = −
fisi,F1sni,F>0 − fi−1si−1,F1sni−1,F>0
Δb
−
fi+1si+1,B1sni+1,B<0 − fisi,B1sni,B<0
Δb
+
fi+1 (σbi+1)
2 + fi−1 (σbi−1)
2 − 2fi (σbi)2
2 (Δb)2
+ χh1θ(I+1) − χh1I+1,
or equivalently
fi−1ξi−1 + fi+1αi+1 + fi


βi −
1
Δ
− ρ

= 0. (40)
The boundary conditions are b ≥ 0 and f (b∗) = 0. Therefore, (40) is also a system of I linear
equations which can be written in matrix notation as:


A−


1
Δ
+ ρ

I−ξI1I
T
f = h, (41)
where

A−

1
Δ + ρ

I−ξI1I
T
is the transpose of

A−

1
Δ + ρ

I−ξI1I

= limn→∞

An−

1
Δ + ρ

I−ξnI1I

,
and An was defined in (35). h = 1I −1θ(I+1) is a vector of zeros with a +1 at position I and a −1
at position θ (I + 1) .42 We solve the system (41) and obtain a solution fˆ . Then we renormalize as
fi =
fˆiI
i=1 fˆiΔb
.
E. Data Appendix
Data on GDP, inflation and current account balance for the five EMU periphery countries (Greece,
Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain), and inflation for the United States, come from the IMF’s World
42Here we are approximating the exit point by b∗ −Δb instead of b∗, as the latter does not belong to the grid.
Notice also how we do not include the term χh due to the linearity and the rescaling of the system.
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Economic Outlook database. The inflation differential is computed as the difference between the
average inflation in the EMU periphery and that of the United States for the period 1987-1997.
External public debt is “General Government Gross consolidated Debt held by non-residents
of the Member State” and is taken from each country’s national accounts. Sovereign risk premia
(spreads) are the difference between the average yield on 10-year bonds of EMU periphery countries
and that of German bonds, taken from Bloomberg. We use the yield on the German 10-year bond
(also from Bloomberg) as the empirical proxy for the model’s riskless yield, r˜t. Bond yields for
the pre-EMU period are annual and are taken from the European Commission’s macroeconomic
database (AMECO).
All data are annual except bond yields and risk premia which are quarterly. We stop the sample
for yields and risk premia in 2012:Q2 (included) in order to isolate our analysis from the effects of
the annoucement by the European Central Bank of the Outright MonetaryTransactions (OMT)
programme in the summer of 2012.
F. Value functions for alternative calibrations
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Figure 6: Value functions for alternative calibrations
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